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Archive for the ‘Leadership’ Category

Last year, Tearfund embarked on a 6 month research project, funded by the Humanitarian Innovation Fund, to explore accountability in remotely managed projects.  Stakeholders from INGOs, NGOs, UN agencies, donors and research organizations participated, producing the report Monitoring and accountability practices for remotely managed projects implemented in volatile operating environments.

Remote management approaches are becoming increasingly common in humanitarian operations.  Though many publications have covered this subject, research found that “there was limited evidence that creative processes had been applied to considering accountability through the lens of remote management.”  This report highlights several key areas in which more attention is needed; with many examples of good practices featured as well. 

 

Apparent, however, was that often this good practice was confined to individual organisations rather than its being shared more widely to promote learning and best practice. A significant portion of the information required is already out there; the challenge is to ensure that this good practice is shared and communicated in a way that it is practical and realistic.

Key Issues Identified

Decrease in program quality – Weak technical oversight – Poor communication between offices – Increased fraud and corruption – Inaccurate data – Limited capacity of personnel – Irregular access to beneficiaries – Increased security threats – Increased political/social pressure on local staff

Recommendations

Key recommendations fell into six different categories: establishing and delivering on commitments, staff competency, sharing information, participation, beneficiary feedback and complaints handling, and learning and continual improvement.  These recommendations included the following:

1.) Establish a beneficiary accountability focal person at the program head office and the local project office, and initiate a beneficiary accountability working group at a regional and/or country level, with local staff participation.  Ensure that there is sufficient time and preparation to develop contextually appropriate beneficiary accountability approaches for the remotely managed project.

2.) Increase resources for internal and external training, develop training programs to promote beneficiary accountability specific to the remote management context, and provide adequate follow-up after training.   Staff capacity is a significant issue for remotely managed projects.  The report states,

Staff capacity issues were often worse in remote management situations where senior programme staff were not based with local staff and could not provide day-to-day mentoring and capacity building opportunities. Staff training workshops represent an additional expense, requiring trainers to travel to the project location (which is not always possible in insecure environments), or requiring project staff to travel elsewhere for training.

Those programs, however, that switched from direct management to remote management were found to be better implemented, because training was done before the program head office was moved. 

3.) Provide regular opportunities for local staff to present findings related to beneficiary accountability practice (e.g. methods that work particularly well) to senior program management.

4.) Develop additional structures within the community to promote beneficiary participation.  Also, ensure that agreement is reached between senior management and local staff on the content of information shared with beneficiaries about project activities and safe and practical means of sharing this information.  Additionally, as in any humanitarian intervention, it is critical to develop complaint and response mechanisms.  In remote management situations, it is particularly important to make certain that this feedback and reporting system is supported by third-party verification (e.g. visits by senior national personnel; peer monitoring by other agencies; meetings at a secure location between beneficiary representatives and senior expatriate personnel).

5.) Consider whether it is practical and appropriate to meet with beneficiaries outside of a project implementation area, as remote meetings could involve significant risk.  In addition, conducting such meetings could lead to contact only with beneficiaries who are not necessarily representative of the wider beneficiary group.

These are just a few highlights.  We encourage you to read the entire report here for more information!

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The AIM Standing Team deployment to Bangladesh was met with success!

meeting with a community in the field

Despite a major strike during the deployment and restricted ability to freely move about, AIM Standing Team members Saji  from World Vision India and Shagufta from Mercy Corps Pakistan were still able to meet the deployment  objectives in time. The deployment lasted from April 22 to May 6. The purpose of the deployment was to review and document current practices of accountability and impact measurement of ECB and its member agencies in emergency response over the last year, in order to identify strengths and gaps and produce an action plan that paves the way forward.

They visited with several NGOs, field staff, partners, and communities to discuss standards, policies, practices and initiatives around accountability. On May 3 they conducted a workshop for focal points and steering committee members (senior management) from Oxfam, CARE, World Vision, Concern Worldwide, Save the Children and the ECB Bangladesh consortium. At the workshop Shagufta and Saji shared their findings. Then workshop participants identified their own agency-level and ECB recommendations.  After this exercise, Shagufta and Saji shared their own recommendations. The participants are to create an action plan with the rest of their agency staff and submit by next week.

The review of the practice of accountability among ECB agencies in Bangladesh is not a thorough study to identify their specific strengths and gaps. The findings are general.

Here are some of their findings:

Meeting with women beneficiaries

Leadership/Governance

  • Among almost all agencies, there is a commitment to accountability in their country strategies and policies and among senior management. However, there were not enough resources allocated to the practice.
  • Agencies knew about the Good Enough Guide and ECB’s Key Elements of Accountability, but no evidence was found of actually using these. 
  • Most of the agencies have incorporated accountability in program proposals but mostly in terms of sharing information and involving communities.
  • Some agencies use results from reviews and evaluations to improve their practices.

Transparency

  • Some organizations shared information with communities about projects, plans and activities, particularly beneficiary selection criteria and relevant financial information, using banners and information boards.  However, because a majority of the population is illiterate, they were not completely aware of project details.
  • Progress/performance reports of project are not shared with communities.
  • Involving communities and sharing information have given NGOs a positive image and increased trust by the communities.

Feedback

  • Feedback and complaint mechanisms were used in communities and people were aware of their right to complain. However, serious weaknesses were found in such mechanisms. Such systems were not formally agreed upon with communities. Communities did not know how to complain. No field staff and managers dedicated to the Complaints and Response Mechanisms (CRM) were found, and no documentary evidence was found of incorporating communities’ feedback.

Participation

  • Communities were consulted during needs assessments, and all agencies involved communities during project implementation. Communities were involved only a little in assessment of impact of the project. There was no evidence of involving communities in the development of proposals, activities and plans.
  • Agencies used various means of communicating with communities about project interventions, including focus group discussions, loud speakers, information boards, etcetera. Such diversity of communication ensured information reached all segments of the population. 
  • Communities need more information about their rights to assistance and in order to ask questions.

Design, Monitoring and Evaluation

  • Many good accountability practices were found but were not documented, i.e. in case studies, reports, complaints handling.
  • Agencies do evaluate projects but with little to no focus on accountability
  • There was no evidence of sharing progress and evaluation reports with relevant communities.

Discussing the findings and brainstorming recommendations for the action plan at the workshop

Shagufta wrote

We are so happy we received very positive responses from [workshop] participants. Everyone agreed with our findings and used many of them for their actions plans.

We will post a few videos of participants discussing the outcome of the deployment after the workshop. Stay tuned!

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The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) published in October 2011 the Lessons Paper: Humanitarian Action in Drought-Related Emergencies by Kerren Hedlund and Paul Knox Clarke . The Lessons Paper, also available in Spanish, French and Arabic, identifies 17 key lessons for humanitarian agencies responding to droughts.  Topics such as early warning, targeting, working with government, cash and vouchers, water interventions and nutrition are included. However, lesson 6 is of particular interest to the AIM Standing Team:

Humanitarians are increasingly demonstrating accountability to an ever larger set of stakeholders. These accountability approaches have the potential to improve programme effectiveness but there is still a long way to go.

So what does the paper suggest regarding accountability practice?

  • Agency accountability to donors should not be done to the detriment of accountability to beneficiaries and impact of the interventions.

Agency staff may have to spend a disproportionate amount of time fulfilling reporting requirements to donors instead of spending their time on the practice of accountability. Staff may also not try out new approaches for fear of failure and consequent non-renewed funding. The paper suggests that donors contribute “to joint/pooled funds to decrease reporting requirements, and by clarifying their attitude to risk and failure. In some cases, it may be more effective for donors to take a ‘portfolio approach’ and consider the combined impact of several related actions rather than expecting each action to be an individual success.”

  • Coordinated action requires agencies to develop mechanisms for collective, multi-agency accountability.

Niger, CARE USA

Effective response, especially those in response to droughts, require much coordination between agencies. As mentioned in the previous blog on collective accountability, beneficiaries do not differentiate between agencies. Thus “there is a growing need for collective accountability mechanisms, where all agencies in a group are jointly accountable to beneficiaries and also accountable to one another. While this is extremely challenging, the international community is increasingly recognising the need to structure joint accountability into consortia and other groups addressing drought response. ECHO’s Regional Drought Decision and USAID’s PLI both include accountability and learning as a cross-cutting theme, and dedicate resources to achieving it.”

  • Agencies need to make use of evidence to implement more cost-effective and impactful interventions.

For example, much evidence exists of the cost-effectiveness and impact of using cash and vouchers, yet agencies still revert to the more traditional approach of food aid.

We want to hear from you! Do you have experience with any of these lessons being put into practice?  Share your thoughts…or questions for the group!

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Maria Kiani, Senior Quality and Accountability Advisor at Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International (HAP), has over nine years experience working in the humanitarian, development and communications sectors. With HAP Maria led deployments after the 2005 Pakistan earthquake and the Sri Lanka civil conflict of 2007, and more recently to Dadaab Refugee camp in Kenya in 2010, Pakistan after the flooding of 2011, and, again, to Kenya in 2011 in response to the Horn of Africa Famine Crisis (a joint deployment of Sphere, HAP and People in Aid). She also supported deployments in 2010 after the earthquake in Haiti and to the civil conflict in Kyrgyzstan.

 We were excited to have an opportunity to speak with Maria!

  1. Can you describe your responsibilities as Senior Quality and Accountability Advisor at HAP? What do you do?

As the Senior Q&A Advisor, I lead HAP’s Roving Team which is deployed across the globe. The Roving Team operates under the New Emergencies Policy, which is a commitment by organisations to make special collective efforts to apply the HAP Principles of Accountability in new or escalated emergencies.

hapinternational.org

Before a deployment, I monitor humanitarian crises around the world and the accountability issues that arise in turn. If a HAP member or agency invokes the New Emergency policy and requests a deployment, I work with our members (82 of them!), fellow Q&A Initiatives, UN agencies and other actors involved in the ongoing response to develop a draft terms of reference (ToR) and seek funding.

When in country, I meet with the stakeholders and interested parties to see if the ToR is relevant, achievable and beneficial to them. I also seek their input and advice in defining what activities to undertake and the appropriate methodologies and time frames. This is particularly important since deployed teams often go into a humanitarian operation where a plan/ToR has been developed without fully understanding the context, nuances, time constraints and work load of staff. Discussing the ToR with the people with whom you will be working and seeking their input helps to create realistic goals and develop a context appropriate approach. It is also a way of increasing ownership and support for the work you will be doing.

During a deployment, I work bi-laterally with various interested agencies, which involves working closely with their senior and frontline staff. Since the aim of a deployment is also to increase collective action, special effort is made to ensure that agencies of various sizes and backgrounds come together to strengthen accountability within the ongoing humanitarian response. This is an important step, since agencies and staff often don’t realise that they the face the same challenges and can find common solutions. There is great value in collective learning and action, and this is often the most satisfying aspect of a deployment.

At the end of the deployment, I consolidate the learning, develop tools and case-studies, debrief senior and headquarter management and write my reports. I continue to provide remote support to the colleagues who I worked with during the deployment through email and Skype. 

My other responsibilities and activities include research (supporting it or conducting it), developing training material, communications and participating in discussions at various fora.

  1.  What have you learned in your current position regarding the practice of accountability around the world?

There are a couple of things:

a)       Accountability is not rocket science! It is about attitude, approach and action: Do we treat affected communities as equals and respect them through our attitudes and actions?  Do we make decisions with them rather than for them, or at the very least explain to them why we made a particular decision?  Accountability can be achieved through simple actions such as communicating who we are, what assistance we will provide, including affected communities in our programmes and decision-making and listening to their concerns and acting on them.  Every action we take matters and has impact.

b)      Communities are very appreciative and understanding: During my discussions with those affected by disaster and conflict across the world, communities mostly appreciate the aid workers and commend them for working in harsh conditions, away from their families. It is about dialogue and transparency. If an agency clearly explains the challenges it faces, such as resources, access, time, insecurity etc, affected communities often understand and offer solutions as well.

c)       Collective action matters: In a humanitarian context, agencies and staff are unified through a common objective of providing assistance on an impartial and humanitarian basis. We face similar challenges and can find joint solutions. Peer learning, joint problem solving and exchange of knowledge is critical. Reports are not necessarily the best way to share learning! We need to find practical and creative ways of sharing knowledge (local and technical), and a more learning-by-doing approach is needed so staff can find context appropriate solutions. Challenges around coordination and communication will persist between agencies, however there are small steps we can take, for example visiting an office of another humanitarian organization to observe a good practice can spark ideas of how you can make changes in your organization. This peer learning approach was used in my deployment to Pakistan in 2011, when a group of agencies had a question and answer session at the Oxfam office on complaints hotlines.

d)     Practice can guide policy and vice-versa: During deployments, you can observe that good practices of accountability are taking place due to initiative, creativity and leadership of some staff members.  There might not be a policy or clear guidance which has resulted in this, so it is important to capture this and share it with the management or headquarters. Based on evidence of successful practices, agencies often create clearer policies and procedures which can result in systematic improvements throughout the organization.

e)       Unpack accountability, what are its elements: As agencies we aspire towards greater accountability through our commitments and mission statements. For example, agencies state that they provide information and undertake participation. But the question would be, are staff clear about the steps involved? Are these steps followed during humanitarian operations? What is the decision-making process on what information can and cannot be provided in a complex operational environment? We need to look at the elements involved in achieving greater accountability and know the minimum requirements to assess these.

  1. What observations have you made about the evolution of the concept/field/mandate of accountability in the last ten or so years?

The sector is changing; there is greater awareness and interest in issues of accountability. The large-scale disasters such as the Tsunami and earthquakes in Haiti and Pakistan have led to a clear recognition that something needs to change within the humanitarian sector if it wants to be effective, efficient and remain true to its foundational principles and values. Last year, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) set the ‘Transformative Agenda’ through which it aims to achieve greater accountability to affected communities in the sector; this is a welcome step. Accountability, individually and collectively is increasingly becoming an important aspect of humanitarian work for agencies.

I think technology will continue to play an exciting role. For example, the youth groups in Dadaab have a facebook page called The Refugee, on which they post pictures, updates and information on humanitarian activities, etc. During the height of the crisis last year, their page was a source of firsthand accounts and details for aid workers and Somali diaspora and other refugees. There are many other interactive platforms such Ushahidi and BetterPlace.org, all of which are exciting components of the sector’s evolutionary process.

  1. What value do you see in the ECB Project’s AIM Standing Team or any organization’s accountability standing team?

I think the ECB’s AIM Standing Team is a great idea! What I particularly like  is that it brings together staff from different agencies, with different perspectives, practices and experiences—which is very important for learning and continual improvement. I participated in the Standing Teaming workshop last year, which gave me an opportunity to connect with some of the team members, and it was a great learning experience. I have continued to stay in contact with some of the team members, and we have shared information, resources and contacts for the emergency in Horn of Africa. 

The team, once deployed, becomes a part of the unfolding humanitarian operation and brings their experience from other locations to the deployment.  The team is a resource which staff can draw upon; problems can be discussed and solved more quickly and in a context appropriate manner. The deployment/standing team members can act as connectors between the frontline, senior staff and headquarters. This is important as the context on the ground is evolving fast; the team can help overcome the disconnects between headquarters and operational sites. One thing to keep in mind, however, is the need to have a clear exit and follow-up strategy to ensure that all the hard work is not lost!

I think the added value of a deployment/standing/surge capacity team is that it brings attention to the issue of accountability in emergencies. Such teams can be effective in reinforcing and practically supporting accountability during emergencies.

  1. What advice do you have for the AIM Standing Team?

Be flexible: When deployed, you can be thrown in the middle of an operation which is unfolding, staff members don’t have a lot of time available to go through detailed orientations and explanations. Have a schedule for activities but be flexible and adjustable. You have to proactively seek opportunities to engage people, such as during breaks or in the vehicle on a trip to a distribution site etc. Leave a margin in your planning for sudden changes. 

Remember everyone you meet is important: ask questions and be curious. We often forget that drivers, cooks, support staff can be very good source of insights. Simple questions like, “Have you been given an induction? Did you sign a code of conduct? Was it in a language you understand? Did anyone explain the code of conduct to you? What work does your organization do,” etc can help you create a map of how well understanding of accountability flows throughout the organization.

Pace yourself: A deployment can be quite intense. There are activities you need to prepare, plan and execute for the deployment and there might be issues of work you need to address from your headquarters or parent organization. It is important to pace yourself and set achievable and realistic targets.

Sometimes results aren’t immediate: At times it is hard to not be able to see immediate results of the support you have given. Change takes times and follow-up is important, so that is something that needs to be factored in when preparing and planning for your deployment.

 Pair up and check in:  Deployments can be intense and you also need support, so find a colleague or friend you can check in with during deployments. Gregory Gleed, my colleague, who is deployed with me, is great to work with and working as a team helps to achieve better results. In a team every member has strengths and areas that need improvement (mine being excel sheets and numbers!).  A deployment is also an opportunity for learning and self-growth- we can learn from our peers about new approaches, facilitation skills, tools and coping with pressures, etc and their feedback can help us to improve.

  1. How can the Standing Team work with HAP?

I think it would be great if the Standing Team and HAP Roving Team could undertake a deployment together! It could have a wider outreach and would be a great learning opportunity for both teams. HAP will be reviewing its New Emergency Policy, under which the Roving Team works.  We will look at how we work with other surge capacity/standing teams. Staff from our member agencies were seconded for the HAP deployments in Haiti and Dadaab (Northern Kenya) to the Roving Team. I think secondments, joint deployments or working jointly if deployed in the same location, having periodic conference calls, or having a common web platform to share ideas and resources are some of the ways in which we can explore this further- we just have to be creative and committed!

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Julien Harneis (via flickr)

“United we stand?”

Given the significant efforts made to strengthen collective humanitarian action it is curious that there has been such little thought given to collective accountability. This gap is most glaring at the level where it is most urgently required: the most senior levels of humanitarian leadership in-country. In humanitarian hubs such as Port au Prince, Islamabad and Addis Ababa, where heads of agencies plan the delivery of millions of dollars of assistance to those in urgent need, it is of considerable concern that there is no single person or collective entity accountable for achieving humanitarian goals or leading humanitarian action.

Andy Featherstone, an independent consultant and author of a January 2011 Humanitarian Exchange Magazine article, “United we stand? Collective accountability in the humanitarian sector,” made this poignant remark on the deficit of collective accountability in humanitarian action.

As a clear example, let’s look at the role of the United Nation’s Humanitarian Coordinator (HC).  The HC is the senior-most UN official in a humanitarian emergency. This individual leads and coordinates the actions of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), made up of UN and NGO senior staff,  and committed to such coordination. However, the HC does not have control over the results of agency interventions nor any authority over the agencies. While the Terms of Reference for the Humanitarian Coordinator mentions his/her accountability to the process and the results of humanitarian action, it is unclear who or what holds that individual accountable.  In turn, no one does—even when the Humanitarian Coordinator is responsible for how tens of millions of dollars of relief funding is used.

Imogen Wall

Initiatives for collective accountability

Andy Featherstone states that it is this accountability deficit in the UN/HCT system that needs to be addressed. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s (IASC) Transformative Agenda is a stepping stone towards collective accountability. The agenda was set at the end of 2010 to improve leadership, coordination and accountability to performance and beneficiaries in humanitarian action. One of the components of the Transformative Agenda is mutual accountability between agencies in the HCT and between agencies and the HC. Andy Featherstone made clear in the March 22 webinar on humanitarian assistance that mutual accountability was a stepping stone to collective accountability and that:

[the Transformative Agenda] also has the potential to significantly strengthen humanitarian outcomes for those in need of assistance. But it will raise complex dilemmas about agency independence, particularly at a time when divisions run deep in some of the more complex responses.

For example, in Afghanistan there is insufficient level of trust between agencies, causing pushback on collective accountability, cooperation and coordination. But because of the potential to improve humanitarian outcomes, such coordination would be worth it, said Andy Featherstone. According to his research (most of which took place in Pakistan), communities do not differentiate between agencies. They judge agencies collectively, not individually. Thus it would behoove the agencies themselves to practice accountability collectively.

A many are aware, there are strong initiatives that are outside the HCT system that aim for collective accountability:

The New Emergencies Policy is a commitment made in 2004 by HAP member organisations to make special collective efforts to apply the HAP Principles of Accountability in new or escalated emergencies. 

And, of course the Emergency Capacity Building Project!  Aiming to improve the practice of accountability through capacity building, sharing learning, guidelines and tools to take practical steps in basic accountability.  The formation and deployment of the accountability standing team in order to build capacity of its own member agencies is a big step forward in this movement toward collective accountability!

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So, you asked for more case studies…and we have found you some!

Why do accountability? A business case from Sri Lanka is a case study that examines the contributions of an independent Humanitarian Accountability Team (HAT) within World Vision’s Sri Lanka’s Tsunami Response Team (LTRT) program.  In order to demonstrate what accountability to beneficiaries looks like on the ground, this study makes the case for having empowered humanitarian accountability teams in the field and describes what is needed to make them work.

After the 2004 tsunami in Sri Lanka, the Sri Lanka Tsunami Response Team (LTRT) was formed with a Humanitarian Accountability Team (HAT) set up within it, separate from the technical programming and program support teams. By the way, the HAT Team Leader was one of ECB’s Staff Capacity Advisers (and former AIM Adviser), Alexandra Levaditis! The HAT complimented the program implementation by focusing on community engagement and liaising with NGOs and the government. The field-based HAT included Stakeholder Representatives that worked closely with communities and District Liaison Officers to coordinate activities and communicate with other NGOs and the government.  The operational responsibilities of the HAT included facilitating assessments, refining beneficiary lists, managing community complaints and dealing with many government liaison and coordination issues.

Advantages of the Humanitarian Accountability Team

crwrc.org

  • National staff have learned that the consideration of local perspectives and needs is valuable, because it helps the staff to better meet those needs.
  • The HAT served as the primary point of contact in the field, which built trust and therefore improved communication and the quality of the program services. For example, when a project budget was cut, World Vision was able to convey this to the community and prioritize programming according to  needs. Such communication helped deter/reduce corruption because complaints could be made.

Splitting responsibility for accountability and programming

  • Having a HAT focus on beneficiaries allowed it to find problems and solve them more quickly. Since there was a HAT representative on the senior management team, this kept the latter in tune with beneficiaries’ issues/needs.
  • It was easier to hire staff when the job descriptions did not require both technical expertise and accountability expertise, a rare combination of skills. Technical staff were able to perform their job well without having to consult with communities and handle complaints at the same time. HAP staff could focus on beneficiaries and, for example, conduct greater quality community consultations.

Saved scarce resources

  • “Through good community engagement and liaison with stakeholders, HAT was able to save LTRT over USD 5 million in construction costs by preventing either unsuitable or unneeded construction in the south.”
  • Working with communities to refine beneficiary lists reduced them by 40% on average.

Enabling Factors that made the HAT successful in the LTRT program

  • Senior leadership needs to support HAT staff to be able to follow through with complaints internally to resolve problems.
  • The HAT should be separate from other units and have its own budget so it can focus on accountability only, maintain independence and protect its budget from cuts.
  • All staff, from guards, receptionists and drivers to engineers, need to be sensitized to the value of accountability and trained how to address beneficiary complaints and questions. This is to avoid non-HAP staff incorrectly handling complaints or questions.
  • The HAT only focused on one area of programming (shelter) so as to not be spread too thin. This was the area with the greatest risk of accountability issues.
  • The cost of running the HAT was 3% of the annual project budget ($1.3 million out of $40 million per year).

So, have a look at the World Vision Humanitarian Accountability Team case study!

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Here’s an issue Standing Team members will be interested in. Take a look and tell us what you think!

The Humanitarian Practice Network of the Overseas Development Institute dedicated its October 2011 Humanitarian Exchange magazine to accountability in humanitarian action. In their overview article the coeditors, John Mitchell and Paul Knox-Clarke of ALNAP, reflect on the underlying rationales – both moral and practical – we use to justify our commitments to improving accountability, and whether our understanding of accountability has changed in the decade since the ‘accountability revolution’ last featured in Humanitarian Exchange. Other articles discuss collective accountability, Real-Time Evaluations, NGO certification, the role of donors in improving accountability, accountability frameworks and systems, tackling corruption, dealing with sexual abuse by UN and NGO personnel, and case examples from Haiti and South Sudan. Click here for the magazine:  Humanitarian Exchange October 2011, “Humanitarian Accountability”

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The skeleton of the framework is on the table

Participants place the 5 criteria where they belong. A discussion follows focusing on:

  • understanding what each criteria is (what are the questions you would ask about it)
  • how the criteria are related

Here is a flavor of the discussion…

Question: are they standards for accountability or for evaluation?
Answer: BOTH!

The group brainstormed evaluation questions that can fall under each element:

Leadership:

  • How are managers championing accountability?
  • What kind of resources are allocated to accountability?

Transparency:

  • What kind of policies are in place to guide what information can and cannot be shared?
  • What are the procedures for sharing information with stakeholders?

Participation:

  • How does the agency involve community members in decision making?
  • How were the most vulnerable in the community identified and how were they consulted?
  • How were the disaster affected people involved in the design, monitoring (etc.) stages of the project?

 Feedback:

  • How is feedback from the community on M&E findings collected and taken into account?
  • What are the mechanisms for community members to communicate with the agency?
  • How did the agency create a “safe space” for community members to provide feedback?
  • What mechanisms are in place to respond to community feedback?

DM&E:

  • How was a needs assessment used to inform the design of the project?
  • What measures are in place to monitor the implementation of the elements of accountability?
  • How do the M&E tools reflect the interests of community members?

For more information about the framework, refer also to the post about AIM presentation in Jakarta

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